'Why should I care?' Challenging free will attenuates neural reaction to errors by Rigoni, Davide et al.
 1 
 
"Why should I care?" Challenging free will attenuates neural reaction to errors 
Running title: Determinism alters error processing 
Davide Rigoni
1*
, Gilles Pourtois
2
, Marcel Brass
1,3 
1
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium 
2
Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 
9000 Gent, Belgium 
3
Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University Nijmegen, Montessorilaan 3, A.08.29 
6525 HR Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author: 
  
Dr Davide Rigoni 
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Gent 
H. Dunantlaan 2, 9000 - Gent, Belgium 
davide.rigoni@ugent.be 
 
 
© The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: 
journals.permissions@oup.com 
 
 Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Advance Access published May 1, 2014
 at Biom
edical Library G
ent on M
ay 5, 2014
http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 2 
 
Abstract 
Whether human beings have free will or not has been a philosophical question for centuries. The debate 
about free will has recently entered the public arena through mass media and newspaper articles 
commenting on scientific findings that leave little to no room for free will. Previous research has 
shown that encouraging such a deterministic perspective influences behavior, namely by promoting 
cursory and antisocial behavior. Here we propose that such behavioral changes may, at least partly, 
stem from a more basic neurocognitive process related to response monitoring, namely a reduced error 
detection mechanism. Our results show that the Error-Related Negativity, a neural marker of error 
detection, was reduced in individuals led to disbelieve in free will. This finding shows that reducing the 
belief in free will has a specific impact on error detection mechanisms. More generally, it suggests that 
abstract beliefs about intentional control can influence basic and automatic processes related to action 
control. 
Keywords: free will, belief, response monitoring, error detection, error-related negativity 
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1. Introduction 
Whether human beings have free will or not has been a core philosophical question for centuries. Many 
scientists today are quite skeptical about the existence of free will, at least in its traditional conception, 
as it would imply a “ghost in the machine” (Ryle, 1949) and hence entail the homunculus fallacy. 
Already more than 40 years ago, the famous behaviorist B.F. Skinner argued against the “autonomous 
man – the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures of 
freedom and dignity” (Skinner, 2002, p. 200). More recently, the debate about free will has entered the 
public domain through mass media and newspaper articles commenting on scientific findings that 
seemingly leave little to no room for free will. This raises a fundamental question, if it really matters 
whether people believe in free will or not. 
Recent social psychological research has started to address this question. Empirical evidence suggests 
that believing in free will has important consequences for our lives, health and psychological well-
being. For instance, Stillman and colleagues could demonstrate that individuals with strong beliefs in 
free will have better actual job performance and career attitudes than individuals with low beliefs in 
free will (Stillman, Baumeister, Vohs, Lambert, Fincham, & Brewer, 2010). Recent studies in social 
psychology have shown that being exposed to scientific information weakening the belief in free will 
can lead to negative changes in social behavior, such as cheating (Vohs & Schooler, 2008) and 
aggressiveness, and reduces prosocial and altruistic behavior (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 
2009). Further, it has been shown that deterministic primes threatening free will lead to reduced 
autonomous and independent thoughts (Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2012). These results 
suggest that believing in free will is crucial for motivating people to implement effort and deliberation 
in order to overcome automatic thinking and behavior. 
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Why do people that are artificially encouraged to disbelieve in free will show cursory and antisocial 
tendencies? It has been argued that weakening the belief in free will reduces individuals’ will to exert 
self-control (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009). Self-control is demanding and energy-
consuming (Baumeister, 2008), and a disbelief in free will would prevent individuals to invest that 
energy. Here we focused on much more basic neurocognitive processes that may underlie the cursory 
pattern displayed by individuals who are artificially primed to disbelieve in free will. More specifically, 
we propose that such behavioral changes arise from altered response monitoring processes, namely a 
reduced error detection. Interestingly, recent experiments in cognitive neuroscience showed that 
challenging free will can alter basic cognitive and neural processes underlying voluntary actions. 
People induced to disbelieve in free will show altered brain activity underlying motor readiness 
(Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori, & Brass, 2011), reduced intentional inhibition and perceived control (Rigoni, 
Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012), and altered post-error adaptation (Rigoni, Wuilquin, Brass, & 
Burle, 2013).  
The aim of the present study is to test whether weakening people’s belief in free will can alter a basic 
brain process considered to be the hallmark of efficient action control, that is, response monitoring. 
This cognitive capacity is particularly important when errors can be committed, as it is crucial to 
identify whether our ongoing response is correct or erroneous in order to adjust behavior accordingly. 
Our specific hypothesis is that reducing the belief in free will can alter the neurophysiological 
correlates of error monitoring. We recorded response-locked Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) while 
healthy adult participants performed a previously validated speeded go/nogo task (Vocat, Pourtois, & 
Vuilleumier, 2008; Pourtois, 2011). In a typical go/nogo task, participants are asked to respond as 
quickly as possible to dominant go stimuli that are often presented on a computer screen. In a minority 
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of trials, deviant nogo stimuli indicate that the participant has to withhold responding. The use of time 
pressure in this type of tasks typically results in people committing a considerable number of response 
errors. Earlier psychophysiological studies showed that when a response error is produced during 
similar interference tasks, a negative wave appears over fronto-central electrodes starting just before 
the onset of the mechanical response and peaking within ~0-100 ms following it (Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990; 1991; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). This error-related deflection is often referred to as 
Error-Related Negativity (ERN) and empirical evidence suggests that it is generated within the medial 
prefrontal cortex, most likely the anterior cingulate cortex (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004) or the supplementary motor area (Bonini, Burle, Liégeois-Chauvel, Régis, 
Chauvel, & Vidal, 2014). Different cognitive interpretations have been put forward to account for the 
functional significance of the ERN (e.g. “pure” error detection, conflict monitoring, “generic” 
mismatch detection, negative reinforcement learning), but at present there is no general agreement on 
what is the specific function reflected by the ERN. However, there is little doubt that the ERN is 
involved in the early stages of response monitoring during or following action execution (e.g. 
Weinberg, Riesel, & Hajcak, 2012).  
Recent evidence suggests that the ERN does not reflect a purely cognitive response monitoring 
mechanism, but rather it is modulated by motivational and affective factors and can be influenced by 
current individuals’ motivational states. In this view, the ERN would entail a rapid motivational 
reaction to a deviation of one’s own performance, and would thus represent a kind of “cortical alarm 
bell” (Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010), a neural marker of how much a person is concerned about performance 
outcomes. Empirical support for a motivational/affective account of the ERN comes from studies that 
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examined the effect of distress levels on people’s reaction to errors. A few studies found larger ERN in 
patients with anxiety disorders than in healthy controls (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Aarts & 
Pourtois, 2010). Similarly, anxiolytic and antidepressant drugs reduce the amplitude of the ERN 
(Johannes, Wieringa, Nager, Dengler, & Munte 2001; de Bruijn, Sabbe, Hulstijn, Ruigt, & Verkes, 
2006). Other studies have described how the amplitude of the ERN changes according to contextual 
motivational factors, such as monetary incentives that are offered for accuracy (Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). It has also been 
proposed that very abstract beliefs, such as religious beliefs, can mitigate distress reactions to errors 
(Inzlicht, NcGregor, Hirsh, & Nash, 2009; Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010). For instance, Inzlicht and Tullett 
(2010) showed that religious primes reduce the amplitude of the ERN in individuals who strongly 
believe in God.  
Consistent with this framework, we propose that the cursory inclination displayed by individuals 
encouraged to disbelieve in free will (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009) is associated to 
traceable changes in brain systems that underlie response monitoring mechanisms, and in particular the 
detection of response errors. More specifically, we reckon that artificially weakening the belief in free 
will (through a standard induction technique, see Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Rigoni et al., 2011; 2013) 
could alter early stages of response monitoring, and thus blunt the ERN. 
Another ERP component that is observed when people commit a response error is the error positivity 
(Pe; Falkenstein et al., 1991). The Pe is a slow positive wave that follows the ERN and that peaks 
between 200 and 500 ms following error commission. The Pe is not a uniform deflection as it appears 
to consist of an initial component (early-Pe) that immediately follows the ERN and has a fronto-central 
distribution, and a slower component (late-Pe) that shows a more posterior scalp distribution 
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(O'Connell, Dockree, Bellgrove, Turin, Ward, Foxe, & Robertson, 2009; Endrass, Klawohn, Preuss, & 
Kathmann, 2012). Empirical evidence suggests that the Pe reflects aspects of error-related processing 
that are independent from those manifested by the ERN (for a review, see Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005). More precisely, the Pe appears to reflect error awareness and is linked to strategic 
and remedial processes, such as post-error adaptation (Endrass, Franke, & Kathmann, 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009). 
However, given that the specificity of the Pe for error monitoring processes remains debated 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2009), we did not formulate clear predictions regarding possible modulatory 
effects of free will depletion on this component in the current study. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Thirty-three volunteers (26 females, 7 males; mean age = 23.14, SD = 3.95) with no psychiatric or 
neurological history participated to the experiment, provided informed consent, and were compensated 
20 euros for their participation. Data from 3 participants were excluded from statistical analyses 
because there were less than 6 artifact-free error trials in the baseline session (see section 2.2.), a 
number that prevents to compute reliable error-related ERP waveforms (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009). The 
study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Faculty of Psychological and Educational Sciences, Ghent University. 
 
2.2. Experimental design and procedure  
The experimental design was divided into a baseline and a post-manipulation session. 
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2.2.1. Baseline session and belief manipulation 
In the baseline session, after installing the EEG cap and the electrodes, participants performed the 
speeded go/nogo task (see section 2.3.). Participants were then randomly allocated to one out of two 
different conditions. The no-free will group (n=15) read an excerpt from the book entitled The 
Astonishing Hypothesis, by Francis Crick (1994), that challenges in several ways the existence of free 
will – e.g. that scientists now recognize that free will is an illusion, that there is no soul, that our 
behavior is totally determined by chemical processes. Conversely the control group (n=15) read a 
passage from the same book that did not mention free will (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Both texts were 
translated into Dutch by a native speaker and were about one A4 page long. The anti free will text 
counted 644 words, while the control text counted 529 words. Participants were given up to 5 minutes 
and were encouraged to read the text carefully, and they were told that a comprehension/memory test 
would be administered at the end of the experiment.  
 
2.2.1. Post-manipulation session 
During the post-manipulation session (i.e. after reading the text), each participant carried out again the 
same speeded go/nogo task. At the end of the experimental session, participants completed the Positive 
and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark and Tellegen 1988), and the Free Will and 
Determinism-Plus scale (FAD-Plus; Paulhus and Carey, 2011). The FAD-Plus is composed by 27 
Likert-type items (scores ranging from 1 = totally disagree, to 5 = totally agree) measuring beliefs 
about free will and related constructs (i.e. free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and 
unpredictability). A global FAD-Plus score was calculated separately for each individual (Lynn, Van 
Dessel and Brass, 2013). In order to obtain a positive score of the belief in free will, individuals scores 
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on the Scientific Determinism (7 items), the Fatalistic Determinism (5 items), and Unpredictability (8 
items) subscales were inversed and aggregated to the score on the Free Will subscale (7 items). 
The whole experiment lasted about 2 hours. 
 
2.3. Stimuli and task 
The go/nogo task used in the present study has been used and described extensively elsewhere (Vocat, 
Pourtois, Vuilleumier 2008; Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, Vuilleumier 2010; Koban, Brass, Lynn, Pourtois 
2012; Pourtois, 2011; Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; 2012). Each trial started with a fixation cross, displayed 
for 1 s in the center of the screen, followed by a black arrow that changed color after a randomly 
jittered interval (ranging from 1s to 2 s). In 2/3 of the trials – i.e. go trials – the arrow turned green, 
indicating that participants should respond as quickly as possible by pressing the space bar. In the 
remaining 1/3 of the trials – i.e. nogo trials – the arrow turned either turquoise, or turned green but 
changed in-plane orientation (relative to the black arrow), indicating that participants had to withhold 
their response. One second after the response, a performance feedback was given as a green or red 
circle for correct versus incorrect responses, respectively. Participants performed six blocks in the 
baseline session and six blocks in the post-manipulation session. Each of the six blocks consisted of 60 
trials shown in random order (40 go and 20 nogo), resulting in 360 trials in total (~30 min) per session. 
In order to obtain an adequate number of “unwanted” response error in both groups, an individually 
calibrated and updated speed pressure was imposed (yielding many false alarms on the nogo trials 
throughout the experimental session; see Vocat et al., 2008). Using this procedure, only fast responses 
(i.e., hits made below a pre-defined RT cutoff; “fast hits”) were eventually associated with a positive 
feedback. RTs for hits above this limit (“slow hits”) were associated with a negative feedback. Fast vs. 
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slow responses were determined by calibrating an individual RT limit in three interspersed calibration 
blocks. Each calibration block was similar to the experimental blocks, but consisted of only 12 trials (8 
go, 4 nogo), and was presented before two consecutive experimental blocks. Calibration of RT was 
never disclosed to participants. This speed pressure promoted the use of an impulsive response mode 
and hence the occurrence of many responses errors, allowing for reliable error-related ERP waveforms 
in each condition.  
The experiment took place in an electromagnetically shielded room. Stimulus presentations and all 
stimulus and response timing were controlled using E-Prime 2 (Schneider, Eshman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002). Stimuli were displayed on a 17 inch Dell 1708FPb flat panel monitor positioned at eye height 
approximately 60 cm from participants. 
 
2.4. EEG recording and signal processing 
EEG was recorded (sampling rate 2048 Hz) from 64 active Ag-AgCl electrodes (BioSemi Active-Two, 
BioSemi, Amsterdam) mounted in an elastic cap. Raw EEG traces were down-sampled offline to 512 
Hz, re-referenced to averaged mastoids and filtered (0.1–30 Hz). Ocular movements were corrected 
following the standard procedure developed earlier by Gratton and Coles (1983) as implemented in 
Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0 software. The epochs were segmented from −500 to 500 ms time-locked to 
the response, separately for fast correct hits and commission errors. Epochs containing global and local 
(i.e. at one electrode only) artifacts were rejected prior to baseline correction (from -500 ms to -300 ms 
relative to the button press) on the basis of visual inspection and automatic artifact detection (i.e. 
epochs exceeding ±100 µV). Individual epochs were averaged separately for each condition and 
participant.  
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Difference waves were then computed for each participant by subtracting the averaged waveform for 
fast hits from the averaged waveform for response errors (Falkenstein et al., 1991). The ∆ERN was 
calculated at electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz as the mean amplitude in the time window from -25 ms to 25 
ms around the response. While the early-PE and the late-Pe usually have distinctive scalp distributions 
– i.e. frontal-central and centro-parietal, respectively – the latency of these two components depends on 
the specific task demands (Overbeek et al., 2005). In light of the topographical properties of the current 
data set and based on previous ERP studies using a similar go/nogo task (Ruchsow, Grön, Reuter, 
Spitzer, Hermle, & Kiefer, 2005; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000), the early-Pe 
was computed at fronto-central electrodes Fz, FCz, and Cz as the mean amplitude spanning from 100 
ms to 250 ms following response onset. The late-Pe was measured at posterior parietal electrodes CPz 
and Pz as the mean amplitude spanning from 250 ms to 400 ms after response onset. 
3. Results 
3.1. Go/nogo task 
Error rate and RTs were submitted to separate mixed ANOVAs with Session (baseline, post-
manipulation) as within-subjects factor and Group (no-free will, control) as between-subjects factor. 
Since slow hits are typically characterized by a different RT distribution and are more frequent than 
fast hits and errors (Pourtois, 2001), they were analyzed separately in the RTs analysis. In addition, 
while fast hits and errors are associated to a clear positive and negative valence, respectively, slow hits 
are typically associated to a mixed and undifferentiated valence (i.e. neither clearly positive nor 
negative) (Aarts, Houwer, & Pourtois, 2012). For these reasons, slow hits trials were not included in 
the EEG analysis. 
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3.1.1. Error rate 
Overall, participants committed more errors in the post-manipulation session as compared to the 
baseline (13.42 % ± 7.02 vs. 8.8 % ± 4.68, respectively), as revealed by the main effect of Session 
(F(1,28) = 26.47, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .49). Error rate was slightly larger in the no-free will group than in the 
control group (12.79 % ± 6.51 vs. 9.39 % ± 3.57, respectively), but neither the main Group effect 
(F(1,28) = 3.14, p = .09) nor the Group × Session interaction (F(1,28) =.21, p = .65) reached 
significance level (α = .05). 
 
3.1.2. RTs 
Responses faster than 50 ms were considered as anticipations and were therefore excluded from the 
analyses. The Type of trial (fast hits, slow hits, errors) was entered into a mixed ANOVA with Session 
as within-subjects factors, and Group as between-subjects factor. The main effect of Session showed 
that overall RTs were faster in the post-manipulation session than in the baseline session (315.44 ms ± 
44.23 vs. 345.46 ms ± 37.72, respectively; F(1,28) = 39.41, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .59). RTs were slower for 
slow hits (395.67 ms ± 50.51) as compared to fast hits (292.73 ms ± 37.51) and errors (302.95 ms ± 
37.14), as revealed by a significant effect of the Type of trial (F(2,56) = 244.49, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .89). 
The Session × Type of trial interaction was also found to be significant (F(2,56) = 3.33, p = .04, ηp
2 
= 
.11), suggesting a differential effect of Session on the different types of trials (fast hits: 277 ms ± 47 vs. 
307 ms ± 31, post-manipulation session and baseline session, respectively; slow hits: 376 ms ± 55 vs. 
414 ms ± 54; errors: 291 ms ± 40 vs. 314 ms ± 37). Neither other effects nor interaction reached or 
approached significance (.14 < ps < .79).   
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We also wanted to test whether the anti-free will manipulation led to reduced post-error slowing in the 
no-free will group, as reported previously (Rigoni et al., 2013). RTs were submitted to ANOVA with 
Session and Previous trial (correct, error) as within-subjects factors and Group as between-subjects 
factors. The analysis revealed a main effect of Previous trial (F(1, 28) = 38.21, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .58), with 
slower RTs for trials following errors than after correct trials (357.3 ms ± 49.47 vs. 339.31 ms ± 41.6, 
respectively). The main Session effect (F(1, 28) = 23.57, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .46) revealed that participants 
were overall faster in the post-manipulation session as compared to the baseline session (334 ms ± 
51.76 vs. 362.61 ms ± 43.35, respectively). RTs were numerically but not significantly faster in the no-
free will group than in the control group (333.58 ms ± 47.95 vs. 363. 04 ms ± 37.91; F(1,28) = 3.48, p 
= .07). The Session × Type of trial × Group interaction was not significant (F(1, 28) =.45, p = .51), 
showing that the anti-free will manipulation did not lead to reduced post-error slowing in the no-free 
will group. No other effect reached or approached significance (.51 < ps < .94).  
 
3.2. ERPs 
Grand average ERP ∆-waveforms are shown in Figure 1. Components amplitude was entered as 
dependent variable into a mixed ANOVAs with Session (baseline, post-manipulation) and Site (Fz, 
FCz, and Cz for the ERN and the early-∆PE; CPz and Pz for the late-∆PE) as within-subjects factors, 
and Group (no-free will, control) as between-subjects factor. 
 
3.2.1. ∆ERN 
The main effect of Site revealed that the ∆ERN was not uniform across the midline (F(2,58) = 30.44, p 
< .001, ηp
2 
= .15). Paired-samples t-tests showed that it was larger at Cz (-12.31 µV ± 7.12) as 
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compared to both FCz (-11.04 µV ± 6.62; t(29) = -3.49, p = .002) and Fz (-8.47 µV ± 5.32; t(29) = -
5.91, p < .001). Moreover, the ERN uniformly decreased in the post-manipulation as compared to the 
baseline session (-9.96 µV ± 6.73 vs. -11.26 µV ± 6.27, respectively), as revealed by a marginally 
significant effect of Session (F(1,28) = 3.73, p = .06, ηp
2 
= .12). Crucially for our prediction, we found 
that the amplitude of ∆ERN decreased in the post-manipulation compared to the baseline session in the 
no-free will group selectively (-11.38 µV ± 7.51 vs. -8.47 µV ± 6.64), with no such effect in the control 
group (-11.14 µV ± 5.02 vs. -11.44 µV ± 6.71), as revealed by a significant Session × Group 
interaction effect (F(1,29) = 5.69, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .17). Paired-samples t-tests confirmed that the ∆ERN 
significantly decreased in the post-manipulation session compared to the baseline session in the no-free 
will group (-8.47 µV ± 6.64 vs. -11.38 µV ± 7.51, respectively; t(14) = -3.71, p = .002), while it did not 
in the control group (-11.44 µV ± 6.72 vs. -11.14 µV ± 5.02, respectively; t(14) = .28, p = .78). 
Importantly, independent-samples t-tests showed that the no-free will group and the control group had 
comparable ∆ERN amplitudes in the baseline session (t(28) = 28, p = .92), thereby excluding potential 
confounding due to a sampling bias. Neither other main effects nor interactions reached significance 
(.14 < ps < .83). 
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Figure 1 (a) Grand-averaged waveforms from aggregated electrodes (Fz, FCz, and Cz) showing the 
∆ERN activity (from -25 ms to 25 ms relative to response onset, baseline correction from -500 ms to -
300 ms) before and after the belief manipulation, both for the no-free will group and the control group. 
(b) Bar graph showing mean amplitudes of the ∆ERN (error bars refer to standard error of the mean). A 
significant reduction of the ∆ERN amplitude was found in the no-free will group, but not for the 
control group. (c) 3-D topographic maps showing the topographical distribution of the ∆ERN in the 
two groups before and after the belief manipulation.  
 
3.2.2. ∆Pe 
Two distinct components were clearly expressed during the time-interval corresponding to the Pe. The 
early-∆Pe had a clear fronto-central distribution, and peaked between 150 and 250 ms. Conversely, the 
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late-∆Pe showed a parietal maximum between 300 and 400 ms. Concerning the early-∆Pe, the main 
effect of Site was significant (F(2,56) = 14.76, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .35). Paired-comparisons showed that the 
early-∆Pe was larger at FCz (8.09 µV ± 5.91) than at either Fz (6.84 µV ± 5.39; t(29) = 4.99, p < .001) 
or Cz (6.19 µV ± 4.75; t(29) = 4.76, p < .001). No any other effect reached significance (.15 < ps < .87). 
As for the late-∆Pe, its amplitude was not uniform across scalp (4.84 µV ± 4.66 vs. 4.15 µV ± 3.52; 
CPz and Pz, respectively), although the effect of Site was not significant (F(1,28) = 3.44, p = .07). 
Neither other main effects nor interactions reached or approached significance (.22 < ps < .86). 
 
3.3. FAD-plus 
First, we tested whether the two groups differed in their FAD-plus score after the manipulation. 
Previous research has shown inconsistent results regarding the effect of the no-free will manipulation 
on FAD-plus (Rigoni et al., 2013). While numerically the no-free will group indeed showed reduced 
FAD-plus score after the belief manipulation compared to the control group (64.53 ± 10.03 vs. 68.73 ± 
8.48) this difference was not significant (t(28) = -1.24, p = .23).  
More importantly, we wanted to test whether the belief in free will was associated with the amplitude 
of the ERN by performing a correlation analysis between the FAD-Plus score and the amplitude of this 
early error-monitoring component in the post-manipulation session, separately for each group. The 
global FAD-Plus score correlated negatively with the ERN amplitude in the no-free will group 
(Spearman’s rho(15) = –.54, p = .04), suggesting that individuals with low belief in free will had a 
blunted ERN. Such a systematic negative relationship was not found in the control group (Spearman’s 
rho(15) = .42, p = .12).  
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3.4. Auxiliary measures 
We wanted to undermine the possibility that other processes, unrelated to the belief in free will per se, 
might contaminate or conflate the belief manipulation and hence account for the present ERP results. 
Reading a text that challenges free will may have triggered an unspecific emotional arousal in the no-
free will group, and this in turn might have affected the ERN. A mixed ANOVA with the type of 
PANAS scale (positive, negative) as within-subjects factor and Group (no-free will, control) as 
between-subjects factor showed that the two groups scored differently on the PANAS, as revealed by 
the significant type of PANAS scale × Group interaction (F(1,28) = 4.39, p = .045, ηp
2 
= .14). The no-
free will group reported higher scores to the positive scale of the PANAS as compared to the control 
group, but the difference was only marginally significant (30.73 ± 6.89 vs. 26.40 ± 7.54; t(28) = 1.64, p 
= .11). No differences were found concerning the negative scale of the PANAS (15.2 ± 5.19 vs. 17.33 ± 
6.74; t(28) = -.97, p = .34). Scores to the negative and positive scales of the PANAS did not show a 
correlation with the ∆ERN amplitude in the no-free will group (Spearman’s rho(15) = -.36, p = .19; 
Spearman’s rho(15) = -.26, p = .35; respectively), suggesting that the reduction of the ∆ERN in the no-
free will group was not influenced by affective changes induced by the belief manipulation. 
 
4. Discussion 
Here we could demonstrate that “artificially” weakening belief in free will through a standard implicit 
induction technique can alter basic error monitoring processes during a simple and fully unrelated 
speeded go/nogo task. Participants who were led to disbelieve in free will showed reduced ∆ERN 
amplitude, while those who were not induced to disbelieve in free will did not. This finding dovetails 
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the hypothesis that down-playing free will (by means of reading a scientific excerpt) can have profound 
repercussions at the neurocognitive level during the earliest stage of response monitoring.  
The reduction of the ∆ERN could not be due to asymmetries at the behavioral level between the two 
groups. We used a stringent RTs calibration procedure during the speeded go/nogo task enabling us to 
match RT speed and accuracy (and hence the frequency of response errors) between the two groups. 
While participants were overall less accurate during the post-manipulation session relative to the 
baseline session across the two groups, this unspecific effect did not interact with our main 
experimental manipulation.  
The specific interpretation of the current findings depends on the functional significance of such error 
detection system – i.e. the ERN/Pe complex. Strikingly, the belief manipulation effect was specific to 
the ∆ERN, leaving the subsequent ∆Pe unaffected by the belief manipulation. This finding corroborates 
the notion that these two consecutive error-related activities reflect dissociable processes during 
performance monitoring and action control (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & 
Wijnen,2009). The different interpretations of the functional significance of the ERN share in common 
that this error-related component somehow reflects the early (online) evaluation of the motor 
performance during action execution (e.g., Weinberg, Riesel, & Hajcak, 2012). It has been proposed 
that at this early stage, the error detection process reflected by the ERN operates independently of 
conscious error perception, and is not directly involved in the activation of remedial processes – i.e. the 
correction of the ongoing erroneous response. Conversely, a later error monitoring process, reflected by 
the Pe, is associated with the awareness of the occurrence of the incorrect response and is related to 
post-error behavioral adaptation (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass, Reuter, & Kathmann, 2007; 
Steinhauser, & Yeung, 2010). Thus, while the ERN presumably indexes an automatic detection of 
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response errors, the Pe would translate more strategic regulatory processes during action monitoring, 
likely requiring conscious awareness. Our ERP results therefore indicate that the belief manipulation 
influences selectively action monitoring processes deemed rapid and automatic (∆ERN), while leaving 
untouched more controlled and conscious processes (∆Pe). However, earlier studies provided evidence 
that the ERN reflects brain processes that are linked to remedial action processes alike (Burle, Roger, 
Allain, Vidal & Hasbroucq, 2008; Bonini et al., 2014; Debener, Ullsperger, Siegel, Fiehler, Von 
Cramon, & Engel, 2005). For instance, Burle and colleagues (2008) analyzed partial error trials – i.e. 
correct trials showing an early activation of the incorrect response – and demonstrated that the 
amplitude of the ERN correlates to the onset of remediation processes (i.e. the activation of the correct 
response). The ERN was suppressed once the remedial process has started, indicating that the ERN 
reflects the activity of an “alarm signal" which lasts until a remediation process takes place. According 
to this view, the ERN would thus represent a dynamic monitoring process signaling that the correction 
of the ongoing (wrong) response is needed. Therefore, our new findings showing a reduced ∆ERN 
amplitude in the no-free will group suggest that encouraging people to disbelieve in free will actually 
influences such an early and dynamic control process during action monitoring. 
As described in the introduction, several studies already demonstrated that the ERN is also influenced 
by the motivational significance of response errors. For instance larger ERNs have been found for 
response errors associated with a high motivational value, as compared to response errors with a low 
motivational value (Gehring et al., 1993; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004; 
Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). According to this framework one can thus argue that people 
reading a deterministic message denying free will might reason that their behavior is determined or 
caused by something else than their mere intentions or will – i.e. their genetic make-up, environmental 
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factors, or both – and that it is therefore useless to be concerned about the outcome of their own 
actions, as “it does not matter anyway”. This alternative interpretation entails an attenuation of the 
motivational significance of response outcome – i.e. whether the response is correct or not – and might 
thus explain why a reduced ∆ERN was observed in the no-free will group. It should be noted, however, 
that a decrease in the motivational significance of response outcomes should probably influence the Pe 
to a greater extent than the ERN component (Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). Since the ∆Pe remained 
unchanged by the free will manipulation in the current study, an account in terms of reduced 
motivational significance of the response outcome appears unlikely. 
The decrease of the ∆ERN amplitude in the no-free will group during the post-manipulation session 
was found to be proportional to the level of disbelief in this group, further substantiating a link between 
the ∆ERN component and the disbelief in free will. However, the absence of a baseline measurement 
of the belief in free will is a limitation of the current study, since it was not possible to titrate the actual 
change in free will belief following the implicit disbelief manipulation. Accordingly, this correlation 
result should be taken cautiously. 
It must be noted that, in contrast to our previous study showing a reduced post-error slowing effect 
after the anti-free will manipulation (Rigoni et al., 2013), the results of this study do no show a similar 
post-error adaptation effect. However, this discrepancy may be explained by the fact that calibration 
blocks meant to match RTs and error rates between the two groups were used in this study, thereby 
strongly attenuating potential group differences at the behavioral level.  
In this study, we show for the first time that undermining the idea that one can determine one’s own 
behavior has direct measurable effects on a very basic and automatic mechanism involved in the online 
monitoring of (self-generated) actions. The current study does not provide direct evidence for an effect 
 at Biom
edical Library G
ent on M
ay 5, 2014
http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 21 
 
of this early neurophysiological change (at the level of the ERN) on more complex (social) behaviors. 
However, independent evidence suggests that complex behaviors may be altered by similar depletion of 
the belief in free will (for a review, see Rigoni & Brass, 2014), and we reasoned that those behavioral 
changes might stem, at least in part, from a change in early response monitoring brain processes. The 
cursory behavior described in literature (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009; Alquist et al., 
2013), may therefore be the consequence of malfunctioning action control processes, namely reduced 
error monitoring. As such, our new neurophysiological results add to the existing literature showing 
that believing or disbelieving in free will is not entirely innocuous, but instead, it may have real life 
consequences (Stillman et al., 2010). 
More generally, the current results lend support to the proposal that abstract beliefs such as free will 
have measurable consequences onto behavior and cognition, which are however not immediately 
bound to these beliefs but instead fully orthogonal to them (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 
2009; Rigoni & Brass, 2014). As such, our results may also have important implications for a better 
understanding of ubiquitous break-downs in performance monitoring occurring in real-life situations. 
Some of these apparently maladaptive error-prone actions or behaviors might very well stem from 
dynamic changes in the abstract belief system of the participant induced “implicitly” by situational 
factors (e.g., verbal or non-verbal information present in the immediate environment and somehow 
challenging the belief in free will), as opposed to lapses of attention, task involvement, effort or 
motivation per se. While earlier work already clearly showed a reliable influence of the belief in free 
will on complex social behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009), here we show that 
the personal belief system of an adult participant regarding free will, although abstract, may be liable to 
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transient changes that can later impact basic cognitive functions during performance monitoring, in a 
similar manner to what religious beliefs for example may also provoke (Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010). 
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